Pointing and Representing – Three Options

  • Nick Young Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Philosophy Department, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
  • Angelica Kaufmann Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Philosophy Department, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
  • Bence Nanay Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Philosophy Department, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium; Peterhouse, Cambridge University, UK
Keywords: Pointing, Perceptual representation, Nonperceptual representation;

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explore the minimal representational requirements for pointing. One year old children are capable of pointing – what does this tell us about their representational capacities? We analyse three options:

(a)  Pointing presupposes non-perceptual representations

(b)  Pointing does not presuppose any representation at all

(c)  Pointing presupposes perceptual representations

Rather than fully endorsing any of these three options, the aim of the paper is to explore the advantages and disadvantages of each.

Pointing: Where Embodied Cognition Meets the Symbolic Mind
Published
2013-07-01
How to Cite
Young, N., Kaufmann, A., & Nanay, B. (2013). Pointing and Representing – Three Options. HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies, 6(24), 99-123. Retrieved from https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/152
Issue
Vol 6 No 24 (2013): Pointing: Where Embodied Cognition Meets the Symbolic Mind
Section
Articles

Copyright (c) 2013 the author

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