HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies

Introduction

2026-10-26T17:59:55+01:00

To claim that it is impossible to write a history of the analytic–synthetic distinction in the introduction to a journal issue devoted precisely to this topic may seem either as a joke for philosophers or a literary imitation of Magritte’s masterpiece. Yet we believe that neither description is accurate and not merely because there are accounts that prove incompatible, or at least untranslatable due to heterogeneity of the conceptual background and the consequent changes in the use of terms. Rather, it is impossible to write a unified history of the analytic–synthetic distinction because the same terminology has been used to frame entirely different problems–which are linked to that distinction but cannot be reduced to it.

The Stability of the Analytic/Synthetic-Distinction

2026-10-26T17:59:55+01:00

This article proposes a reconstruction of the reason why the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism seemingly disregarded the analytic-/synthetic-distinction altogether: Members of this school regarded incessant conceptual change as a necessary feature of human knowledge. When concepts change, the analytic-/synthetic-distinction shifts accordingly. Since Hermann Cohen (and his students) found no use for such an unstable distinction, they left it out of consideration entirely. As a paradigm example I discuss Hermann Cohen's view in detail, then compare it to Natorp and Cassirer. Finally I point out that there is a striking contrast on this point between the Marburg and the South-Western School of Neo-Kantianism, which correlates with their embrace of realism and idealism respectively.

A Misadventure of the Synthetic: The Curious Case of Fritz London

2026-10-26T17:59:54+01:00

This paper aims to present a largely overlooked chapter in the debate concerning the analytic-synthetic distinction (ASD). London’s intellectual trajectory was distinctive: despite his enduring ambition to become a physicist, he began with a philosophical dissertation exploring the development of deductive theory, drawing inspiration from Husserl’s logical investigations. This framework also informed his first scientific paper, Die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit einer Maßbestimmung in einer physikalischen Mannigfaltigkeit und das Prinzip der Ähnlichkeit, which will be the primary focus of our analysis. In summary, we argue that London’s reflections offer valuable insights into a potential approach that removes the ASD from its usual context, which entails a firm distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements. We shall demonstrate that, while rejecting a strictly Kantian conception of the synthetic a priori, London’s defence of the “autonomy of ideality” does not result in a purely analytic theory of judgments. Rather, echoing Husserl and Cassirer, his proposal aligns more closely with a category that we may term “infra-conceptuality,” which integrates both the conceptual containment of the analytic and the fecundity and productivity of the synthetic. However, we suggest that London’s emphasis on “conventions” and the relative nature of deductive theory would necessitate a reassessment of his relationship with neo-empiricist thought.

Epistemic Analyticity and Inferentialism

2026-10-26T17:59:54+01:00

Strongly analytic assertions (or deductions) are known to be true (or valid) solely by virtue of knowledge of their meaning and are therefore unrevisable. Modestly analytic assertions (or deductions) are recognized as correct in a language solely by virtue of a knowledge of their meaning. Despite Quine’s effective critique of analyticity, philosophers still debate whether there are analytic assertions or deductions. The answer depends on the conception of meaning adopted. According to an inferentialist conception of meaning (inferentialism), to understand a sentence in a language is to apprehend a set of possible meaning-constitutive inferences and assertions in which the sentence occurs. Paul Boghossian proposed a brand of inferentialism in his attempt to salvage strong analyticity. Boghossian’s version of inferentialism faces serious objections, some raised by Timothy Williamson. The main thesis of this paper is that in epistemic contexts there are modestly analytic assertions and inferences. To support this thesis I outline a non-holistic, fallibilist inferentialism in which there are no strongly analytic assertions, but the meaning-constitutive assertions and deductions are modestly analytic.

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Point of Intersection Between Two Traditions in Logic

2026-10-26T17:59:53+01:00

Traditionally there were two approaches to validity and analyticity: The idea that the predicate (consequent) is “analytically contained” in the notion of the subject (antecedents) and The idea that that validity consists in (the preservation of) truth (from antecedents to consequent (under all variation’s). The second idea is explicitly present in TLP in the early 5’s, whereas the first comes to the fore in that tautologicity is meant to be an analytical property of sentences, namely recognisability am Symbol allein. The lecture sketches the historical development of the two traditions in the history of logic and presents the TLP as the point of their intersection, and notes the failure of this Tractarian approach, since logical truth for “multiple generality” is not recognizable by means of mechanical calculation alone.

Sundholm's Theory of Meaning Explanation

2026-10-26T17:59:53+01:00

I provide an overview of some of Sundholm's remarks on the history and philosophy of logic. In particular, I focus on Sundholm's proposal to explain meaning with no object-language/metalanguage distinction, and to provide a consequently contentual approach to formalisms for proofs. When applied to Gentzen's Natural Deduction in its two 1935 and 1936 variants, this triggers a reading of each variant as pointing to one of the poles in the distinction between proof-objects and proof-acts, also introduced by Sundholm. I suggest that the basis of this picture is given by a Martin-Löfian reading of the notion of analytic assertion.

Is Model-Theoretic Logic Analytic Or Synthetic And How Can We Obtain Logical Necessity Through Analyticity?

2026-10-26T17:59:53+01:00

This paper reexamines the question of whether logic is analytic or synthetic, arguing that the issue has transformed rather than vanished. I propose that model-theoretic logic, when interpreted through interpretational semantics, can be regarded as analytic, and that logical necessity can be derived from this analyticity. Revisiting Etchemendy’s distinction between interpretational and representational semantics, I argue that it mirrors the analytic–synthetic divide: the former aligns with truths grounded in meaning, while the latter corresponds to truths dependent on the structure of possible worlds. Etchemendy’s claim that interpretational semantics cannot secure necessity thus challenges the traditional view that logical necessity is explainable through analyticity. In contrast, Gila Sher’s Formality Thesis grounds logic in formal features of the world, presenting logic as synthetic yet necessary. I interpret her view as a reformulation of the analytic/synthetic problem within a formal-structural framework. The paper concludes by defending interpretational semantics and suggesting that the analyticity of logic, properly understood through truth-conditions, can indeed account for logical necessity.

The Pragmatic Maxim and Analytic Truths

2026-10-26T17:59:55+01:00

In Two Dogmas, Quine argues there is no criterion for determining which truths are analytic. This view has a bearing on Peirce’s second grade of clearness in How to Make Our Ideas Clear: if there is no criterion for analyticity, then there is none for determining that a Leibnizian style definition holds, since a sentence expressing such a definition would be analytic. Quine went on to re-envision analytic truths as only relatively immune to change, situated near the center of an imagined web of beliefs. This view of analytic truths seems to find some confirmation from imagining how Peirce’s maxim might apply to such truths. For it might be said that the practical effects of analytic truths is their role in stabilizing our web of belief, a role that also allows for their possible revision.

Analyticity, Necessity and Philosophical Commitment

2026-10-26T17:59:52+01:00

This paper addresses Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Two Dogmas of Empiricism, where he argues that analyticity—truth by meaning alone—cannot be coherently defined without circular reasoning. Quine contends that defining analyticity in terms of necessity leads to circularity because necessity itself presupposes analyticity. In response, this paper uses Kripkean semantics to define analyticity as “global necessity”, or truth in all points of evaluation, thus countering Quine’s circularity objection. The proposed approach relies on Kripke’s modal logic framework, where analyticity can be anchored in the relational structure of possible worlds. By defining analytic statements as those true in all worlds, this proposal allows analyticity to be coherently applied across a family of logical systems, namely the family of normal modal logics. Comparing this approach with Rudolf Carnap’s definition of analyticity from Meaning and Necessity, the paper highlights that Kripkean semantics offers greater flexibility by allowing the same definition of analyticity to be applied across a whole range of frameworks. Thus, while analytic truths become framework-dependent, they preserve their value within formal systems, as well as their conventional character—which was first recognized by Carnap. After discussing a possible application of this work to current debates on topic-neutrality of logic and logical pluralism, the paper concludes that the proposed account of analyticity provides a counterpoint to Quine’s dismissal, supporting the analytic- synthetic distinction as both meaningful and practically useful in logical analyses.