The nature of consciousness has puzzled philosophers for centuries. In the meantime, through immense historical and cultural metamorphoses, the model of scientific objectivity proposed by the natural sciences has established itself as a universal standard of reference for determining any explanation broadly considered ‘scientific.’ The enigma of consciousness thus presents itself to us today with the question: can subjective experience be explained in terms of objectivity compatible with the methods and explanatory possibilities proper to the natural sciences? Two decades ago, these questions were at the heart of “Naturalizing Phenomenology” [NPh], the classical volume edited by J. Petitot, F. Varela, B. Pachoud, and J. Roy (1999). [continue]
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