HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies <p align="justify">Humana.Mente is a biannual journal focusing on contemporary issues in analytic philosophy broadly understood. HM publishes scholarly&nbsp; papers which explore significant theoretical developments within and across such specific sub-areas as: (1) epistemology, methodology, and philosophy of science; (2) Philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences; (3) Phenomenology; (4) Logics and philosophy of language&nbsp; (5) Normative ethics and metaethics. HM publishes special editions devoted to a concentrated effort to investigate important topics in a particular area of philosophy.</p> <p align="justify">ISSN: 1972-1293</p> ETS en-US HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies 1972-1293 Why do We Need to Explore the Social Dimension of the Ethics of Knowledge? <p>This paper introduces and discusses the core themes explored in the special issue on the social dimension of the ethics of knowledge at the intersection between virtue and vice epistemology.</p> Laura Candiotto ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-07-07 2021-07-07 14 39 III X Veritic Desire <p>The intellectual virtues are defined, in part, in terms of a love for the truth: <em>veritic desire</em>. Unpacking this idea is complicated, however, not least because of the difficulty of understanding the truth goal that is associated with veritic desire. In particular, it is argued that this cannot be formulated in terms of the maximization of one’s true beliefs. What is required, it is claimed, is a conception of veritic desire as aiming at understanding the fundamental nature of reality, where this is a virtuous refinement of a crude drive for truth, as opposed to being a way of combining a love of the truth with a further independent good. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> Duncan Pritchard ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-07-06 2021-07-06 14 39 1 21 The Epistemic Good of Epistemic Responsibilist Virtues <p>The question of whether it is a necessary feature of intellectual virtues that they lead to a higher ratio of true to false beliefs has been a continuous controversy. The aim of this paper is to clarify what the instrumental value of intellectual responsibilist virtues amounts to. By spelling out what makes virtues epistemically good in terms of inquiry, a view can be offered that not only elucidates the theoretical and practical demands of intellectual virtues, but that also provides a plausible account of what comprises the instrumental value of responsibilist virtues.</p> Nastasia Müller ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-07-06 2021-07-06 14 39 23 46 A Feeling of Evidence <p>Intuitions play a relevant role in the acquisition of knowledge. Among those who believe that this is the case, some base their claim on the peculiar phenomenology of intuitions. These theorists often adopt a perceptualist and seeming-based model for their phenomenological description. Deeming intuitions as essentially private phenomena, however, seeming-based descriptions end up supporting a dogmatic view of intuitions as a source of epistemic justifications. I argue that this is because the seeming-based model is incomplete in that it does not consider some virtue-related aspects of the plasticity of intuitions in social contexts. Then, I propose a way of integrating an explanation of these aspects in it through a Neo-Kantian reinterpretation of some of the concepts involved. I will draw from the work of Christoph Sigwart on the so-called <em>Evidenzgefühl </em>(“feeling of evidence”) that characterizes the phenomenology of intuitions, showing the ties between this feeling and the linguistic, communicative, and social dimension of scientific research. The broader aim is to suggest that it is possible to make an open-minded use of intuitions even when basing their epistemic relevance on their peculiar phenomenology.</p> Francesco Pisano ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-07-06 2021-07-06 14 39 47 67 A Case for an Historical Vice Epistemology <p>This paper&nbsp;encourages greater engagement between contemporary vice epistemology and the work of intellectual and social historians of the vices. I argue that studies of the nature and significance of epistemic vices and faliings can be enriched by engaging with the methods and results of the historians who share our interest in epistemic character and its failings. To that end, I distinguish between quotidian and esoteric, and betwee&nbsp;transient and promiscuous epistemic vice-concepts and offer illustrative case studies.</p> Ian James Kidd ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-07-06 2021-07-06 14 39 69 86 Cultivating Doxastic Responsibility <p>This paper addresses some of the contours of an ethics of knowledge in the context of <em>ameliorative</em> epistemology, where this term describes epistemological projects aimed at redressing epistemic injustices, improving collective epistemic practices, and educating more effectively for higher-order reflective reasoning dispositions. Virtue theory and embodiment theory together help to tie the cultivation of moral and epistemic emotions to cooperative problem-solving. We examine one cooperative vice, ‘knavery,’ and how David Hume’s little-noticed discussion of it is a forerunner of contemporary game theory’s concern with behavior of ‘free riding’ on systems of trust or cooperation. We develop these and other examples as calling for “risk-aware” social epistemology, which ties <em>epistemic risk</em> (the risk of one’s ‘getting it wrong’) with <em>doxastic responsibility. </em>Risk-aware social epistemology aims at describing and ameliorating epistemic practices<em>, </em>but without confusing over-generalizing about culpability in ways that would conflate philosophical <em>censure</em> or critique of bias, with “blameworthiness” in any stronger sense.</p> Guy Axtell ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-07-06 2021-07-06 14 39 87 125 Civility in the Post-truth Age <p>This paper investigates civility from an Aristotelian perspective and has two objectives. The first is to offer a novel account of this virtue based on Aristotle’s remarks about civic friendship. The proposed account distinguishes two main components of civility—civic benevolence and civil deliberation—and shows how Aristotle’s insights can speak to the needs of our communities today. The notion of civil deliberation is then unpacked into three main dimensions: motivational, inquiry-related, and ethical. The second objective is to illustrate how the post-truth condition—in particular, the spread of misinformation typical of the digital environments we inhabit—obstructs our capacity to cultivate the virtue of civility by impairing every component of civil deliberation. The paper hopes to direct virtue theorists’ attention to the need to foster civic virtues as a means of counteracting the negative aspects of the post-truth age.</p> Maria Silvia Vaccarezza Michel Croce ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-07-06 2021-07-06 14 39 127 150 LGBTQ Identities and Hermeneutical Injustice at the Border <p>This paper applies the framework of epistemic injustice to the context of the asylum process, arguing that asylum seekers are typically at risk of this kind of injustice, which consists in their not being considered credible and not being listened to due to prejudices toward their social identity. More specifically, I address hermeneutical injustice in the adjudication of LGBTQ asylum claims, as well as the possibility of developing practices of hermeneutical justice in this context. I start with a general analysis of epistemic injustice in the asylum process, examining the different ways in which stereotypes and prejudices hinder the process (section 1). Next, I focus on hermeneutical injustice in LGBTQ cases (section 2). In section 3, I expand on the possibility of developing hermeneutical justice in this context. Finally, I conclude by hinting at hinge epistemology as a feasible framework for research on hermeneutical injustice and justice, and at broader theoretical themes stimulated by this reflection.</p> Anna Boncompagni ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-07-06 2021-07-06 14 39 151 174 Resisting Epistemic Oppression <p>In order to address questions about how to conceptualize and resist epistemic oppression most effectively, this essay develops a critical engagement with Kristie Dotson’s (2014) “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.” Relying on a conceptual clarification of what is meant by “shared epistemic resources,” I argue against Dotson’s distinction which finds some instances of epistemic oppression to be “reducible” to the unequal distribution of social and political power, and some to be distinctively epistemic, and thus “irreducible” to these factors. Rather, I maintain the most effective conceptualization of the phenomenon will find that all of its forms have a distinctive epistemic dimension that must be contended with; they are thus irreducible in Dotson’s sense. In other words, the critical interrogation of governing norms will be necessary for resistance in all three cases. I briefly consider the import of my &nbsp;view by looking at epistemic oppression amidst the presidency of Barack Obama.</p> Taylor Rogers ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-07-06 2021-07-06 14 39 175 193 The Limits of a Phenomenological Approach to Metaethics Federico Bina ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-07-06 2021-07-06 14 39 195 202