Significant work has been done in social epistemology in the last decades. Looking at the generation and acquisition of knowledge in social contexts, scholars considered not only ontological and epistemological issues, like the ontology of group minds and the epistemology of the many and different in-group epistemic practices, but also the normative dimension that regulates social epistemic activities, such as group learning and revision of beliefs. Virtue theorists have studied the truth-conduciveness of abilities and character traits of epistemic agents, the so-called intellectual virtues, like open-mindedness, scrutiny, and perseverance, in conjunction with the elaboration of an ethics of knowledge.
Humana.Mente is a biannaual journal focusing on contemporary issues in analytic philosophy broadly understood. HM publishes scholarly papers which explore significant theoretical developments within and across such specific sub-areas as: (1) epistemology, methodology, and philosophy of science; (2) Philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences; (3) Logics and philosophy of language (4) Normative ethics and metaethics. HM publishes special editions devoted to a concentrated effort to investigate important topics in a particular area of philosophy.