Is Model-Theoretic Logic Analytic Or Synthetic And How Can We Obtain Logical Necessity Through Analyticity?

Abstract

This paper reexamines the question of whether logic is analytic or synthetic, arguing that the issue has transformed rather than vanished. I propose that model-theoretic logic, when interpreted through interpretational semantics, can be regarded as analytic, and that logical necessity can be derived from this analyticity. Revisiting Etchemendy’s distinction between interpretational and representational semantics, I argue that it mirrors the analytic–synthetic divide: the former aligns with truths grounded in meaning, while the latter corresponds to truths dependent on the structure of possible worlds. Etchemendy’s claim that interpretational semantics cannot secure necessity thus challenges the traditional view that logical necessity is explainable through analyticity. In contrast, Gila Sher’s Formality Thesis grounds logic in formal features of the world, presenting logic as synthetic yet necessary. I interpret her view as a reformulation of the analytic/synthetic problem within a formal-structural framework. The paper concludes by defending interpretational semantics and suggesting that the analyticity of logic, properly understood through truth-conditions, can indeed account for logical necessity.