Epistemic Analyticity and Inferentialism

Abstract

Strongly analytic assertions (or deductions) are known to be true (or valid) solely by virtue of knowledge of their meaning and are therefore unrevisable. Modestly analytic assertions (or deductions) are recognized as correct in a language solely by virtue of a knowledge of their meaning. Despite Quine’s effective critique of analyticity, philosophers still debate whether there are analytic assertions or deductions. The answer depends on the conception of meaning adopted. According to an inferentialist conception of meaning (inferentialism), to understand a sentence in a language is to apprehend a set of possible meaning-constitutive inferences and assertions in which the sentence occurs. Paul Boghossian proposed a brand of inferentialism in his attempt to salvage strong analyticity. Boghossian’s version of inferentialism faces serious objections, some raised by Timothy Williamson. The main thesis of this paper is that in epistemic contexts there are modestly analytic assertions and inferences. To support this thesis I outline a non-holistic, fallibilist inferentialism in which there are no strongly analytic assertions, but the meaning-constitutive assertions and deductions are modestly analytic.