A Misadventure of the Synthetic: The Curious Case of Fritz London

Abstract

This paper aims to present a largely overlooked chapter in the debate concerning the analytic-synthetic distinction (ASD). London’s intellectual trajectory was distinctive: despite his enduring ambition to become a physicist, he began with a philosophical dissertation exploring the development of deductive theory, drawing inspiration from Husserl’s logical investigations. This framework also informed his first scientific paper, Die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit einer Maßbestimmung in einer physikalischen Mannigfaltigkeit und das Prinzip der Ähnlichkeit, which will be the primary focus of our analysis. In summary, we argue that London’s reflections offer valuable insights into a potential approach that removes the ASD from its usual context, which entails a firm distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements. We shall demonstrate that, while rejecting a strictly Kantian conception of the synthetic a priori, London’s defence of the “autonomy of ideality” does not result in a purely analytic theory of judgments. Rather, echoing Husserl and Cassirer, his proposal aligns more closely with a category that we may term “infra-conceptuality,” which integrates both the conceptual containment of the analytic and the fecundity and productivity of the synthetic. However, we suggest that London’s emphasis on “conventions” and the relative nature of deductive theory would necessitate a reassessment of his relationship with neo-empiricist thought.