Analyticity, Necessity and Philosophical Commitment

An intensional response to Quine’s first dogma

Abstract

This paper addresses Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Two Dogmas of Empiricism, where he argues that analyticity—truth by meaning alone—cannot be coherently defined without circular reasoning. Quine contends that defining analyticity in terms of necessity leads to circularity because necessity itself presupposes analyticity. In response, this paper uses Kripkean semantics to define analyticity as “global necessity”, or truth in all points of evaluation, thus countering Quine’s circularity objection. The proposed approach relies on Kripke’s modal logic framework, where analyticity can be anchored in the relational structure of possible worlds. By defining analytic statements as those true in all worlds, this proposal allows analyticity to be coherently applied across a family of logical systems, namely the family of normal modal logics. Comparing this approach with Rudolf Carnap’s definition of analyticity from Meaning and Necessity, the paper highlights that Kripkean semantics offers greater flexibility by allowing the same definition of analyticity to be applied across a whole range of frameworks. Thus, while analytic truths become framework-dependent, they preserve their value within formal systems, as well as their conventional character—which was first recognized by Carnap. After discussing a possible application of this work to current debates on topic-neutrality of logic and logical pluralism, the paper concludes that the proposed account of analyticity provides a counterpoint to Quine’s dismissal, supporting the analytic- synthetic distinction as both meaningful and practically useful in logical analyses.