The Pragmatic Maxim and Analytic Truths

Abstract

In Two Dogmas, Quine argues there is no criterion for determining which truths are analytic.  This view has a bearing on Peirce’s second grade of clearness in How to Make Our Ideas Clear: if there is no criterion for analyticity, then there is none for determining that a Leibnizian style definition holds, since a sentence expressing such a definition would be analytic.  Quine went on to re-envision analytic truths as only relatively immune to change, situated near the center of an imagined web of beliefs.  This view of analytic truths seems to find some confirmation from imagining how Peirce’s maxim might apply to such truths.  For it might be said that the practical effects of analytic truths is their role in stabilizing our web of belief, a role that also allows for their possible revision.