Prenatal Testing & Selective Abortion

Abstract

I examine both the morality of prenatal testing, as well as selective abortion on the basis of the results of that testing. As our ability to test for a variety of genetic conditions grows, the necessity of a nuanced assessment of this practice increases. First, I explore the permissibility of prenatal testing. I assess arguments that suggest that the fallibility or unreliability of the tests renders them moot for making decisions pertaining to life and death. I then examine arguments that suggest that the very nature of prenatal testing is such that it provides impermissible or immoral directive counseling. If we test to ensure something is not wrong with the fetus, or that everything is normal, it implies that a positive test, or a departure what from is perceived to be normal, is necessarily negative. I suggest that while these arguments are worth taking seriously, ultimately, they do not render the practice of prenatal testing immoral.

Second, I examine the practice of selectively aborting a fetus as a result of a potentially disabling condition. While I acknowledge the ever-present ablest assumptions prevalent in society surrounding what constitutes a life worth living, I suggest that the three dominant kinds of arguments opposing selective abortion, fail. First, selective abortion does not constitute a form of eugenics. Second, disability-bias is an insufficient justification for denying selective abortion rights. Third, and finally, prospective parents do not assent to raise any child, irrespective of the outcomes of a prenatal test.