On the Indispensability of (Im)Possibilia

  • Martin Vacek Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences
Keywords: modal realism, possible worlds, mathematical Platonism


According to modal realism formulated by David Lewis, there exist concrete possible worlds. As he argues the hypothesis is serviceable and that is a sufficient reason to think it is true. On the other side, Lewis does not consider the pragmatic reasons to be conclusive. He admits that the theoretical benefits of modal realism can be illusory or that the acceptance of controversial ontology for the sake of theoretical benefits might be misguided in the first place. In the first part of the paper, I consider the worry and conclude that although the worry is justified, there can be an epistemological justification for his theory. Next, I outline the so-called indispensability argument for the legitimacy of mathematical Platonism. Finally, I argue that the argument, if accepted, can be applied to metaphysics in general, to the arguing for the existence of concrete (im)possibilia in particular.

How to Cite
Vacek, M. (2013). On the Indispensability of (Im)Possibilia. HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies, 6(25), 135-154. Retrieved from https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/138