Ethical, social and political analyses debate whether there are grounds for the reconstruction of the notion of self: the main focus is the broad discontent with the individualistic tradition where the rational agent, or independent self, is considered the fundamental atom of social life. Considering the new understandings of dynamic and distributed processing in our brain, several relevant philosophers of sciences, psychologists and neuroscientists are exploring a similar topic, criticizing a disembodied view of the Self. The aim is that this collection of interdisciplinary studies may serve to develop a more refined and integrated conceptual framework of the Self as embodied and relational. The authors consider this step as important and urgent to address the scientific and ethical challenges of our time.
Humana.Mente is a biannaual journal focusing on contemporary issues in analytic philosophy broadly understood. HM publishes scholarly papers which explore significant theoretical developments within and across such specific sub-areas as: (1) epistemology, methodology, and philosophy of science; (2) Philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences; (3) Logics and philosophy of language (4) Normative ethics and metaethics. HM publishes special editions devoted to a concentrated effort to investigate important topics in a particular area of philosophy.