HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies <p align="justify">Humana.Mente is a biannual journal focusing on contemporary issues in analytic philosophy broadly understood. HM publishes scholarly&nbsp; papers which explore significant theoretical developments within and across such specific sub-areas as: (1) epistemology, methodology, and philosophy of science; (2) Philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences; (3) Phenomenology; (4) Logics and philosophy of language&nbsp; (5) Normative ethics and metaethics. HM publishes special editions devoted to a concentrated effort to investigate important topics in a particular area of philosophy.</p> <p align="justify">ISSN: 1972-1293</p> en-US (Humana.Mente Office) (editorial assistant) Sat, 22 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0100 OJS 60 Teleology and World from Different Perspectives: Philosophy of Mind and Transcendental Phenomenology <p>During the last century, most philosophers of science have tried to expunge teleological explanations from the fields of epistemology. They took for granted that the Darwinian concepts of natural selection and evolution effectively dispense us with any presence of goal-directedness in nature: based on an anti-metaphysical attitude, they hold purposes and goals to be of religious and spiritual nature, thereby obstacles to any effective comprehension of biological processes. Accordingly, teleological categories have been abandoned in many ways in favor of mechanical causes and non-teleological processes: since Darwin demonstrated that no teleology is required in order to explain the natural world, causal explanations became the only tools to investigate natural processes (see Bedau 1991, for a compelling reflection on teleological categories and on their relations with the natural world).</p> Rodolfo Giorgi, Danilo Manca ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sat, 22 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0100 Updating the philosophical concept of form (morphé) as the embodied structural and teleological informational program in human beings <p>The contemporary philosophy of mind and neuroethics are two of the liveliest fields of interdisciplinary reflection which deal with the everlasting topic: what/who we essentially are. One of the many questions that can be tackled in order to go deep in this knowledge is: why man is naturally inclined towards specific tiers for survival which constitute his/her teleological project of flourishing? Two different, but complementary, answers are brought to light in this work. The author argues for an apparently obvious, but relatively underexplored view of the classical hylomorphic concept of form (morphé), not just as the information that characterizes the organization of human body, but also as the intrinsic final reason why, through a specific type of bodily (brain) structure, the human being develops his/her natural inclinations and behaves according to them. The author advances the argument in terms of an upward comparison between the threefold levels of Thomas Aquinas’ natural human inclinations according to Summa Theologiae I-II, question 94, article 2, and the pioneering structural and functional “Triune Brain” model developed from 1949 to 1952 by Paul MacLean. The hylomorphic view sketched is profoundly different from a purely materialistic conception of teleological processes of human behavior, and it is a plausible explanation that motivates and invites further considerations and research.</p> Alberto Carrara ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sat, 22 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0100 Human Beings and Robots: A Matter of Teleology? <p>In this paper, I use the comparison between human beings and intelligent machines to shed light on the concept of teleology. What characterizes human beings and distinguishes them from a robot capable of achieving complex objectives? In the first place, by stipulating that what characterizes human beings are mental states, I consider the mark of the mental. A smart robot probably has no consciousness but we might have reason for doubt while interacting with it. And a smart robot shows intentionality. I focus on the type of naturalized intentionality that is at stake here. Then I go back to the traditional idea of teleology, and to the scientific criticism of it, through the question of the kind of purposes that artificial intelligence (AI) may set itself. Husserl's basic idea of teleology therefore serves to have an authoritative term of comparison and to introduce the intuitive difference between human beings and intelligent machines based on the homo pictor thought experiment proposed by Jonas. My conclusion is that a specific finalism, understood in a non-criterial sense, is what qualifies the human being and differentiates the latter (for now) from smart robots.</p> Andrea Lavazza ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sat, 22 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0100 On the Use and Abuse of Teleology for Life: Intentionality, Naturalism, and Meaning Rationalism in Husserl and Millikan <p>Both Millikan’s brand of naturalistic analytic philosophy and Husserlian phenomenology have held on to teleological notions, despite their being out of favor in mainstream Western philosophy for most of the twentieth century. Both traditions have recognized the need for teleology in order to adequately account for intentionality, the need to adequately account for intentionality in order to adequately account for meaning, and the need for an adequate theory of meaning in order to precisely and consistently describe the world and life. The stark differences between their accounts of these fundamental concepts stem from radically different conceptions of the world, the natural and life. I argue that Millikan’s teleosemantic approach relies on a teleology of determination by means of the lawfulness of nature that leaves no room for the freedom of self-determination, for reason, or for experience—for the reality of lived human life. In contrast to Millikan’s account, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology situates teleology as a function of reason and first-personal experience, part of an extended account of intentionality and meaning according to which the full range of our making sense of the world is conceived as a rational activity that is itself a part of that world, and not an unnatural activity to be separated from it. While Husserl’s account of these issues is indeed symptomatic of what Millikan calls “meaning rationalism,” I argue that it is immune to the sorts of problems she claims will plague any such account, since these problems arise only against the background of a set of presuppositions about intentionality (representationalism, the “mythiness” of all givens) that Husserl does not share. Husserl’s position can itself be understood to be within the bounds of a suitably liberal conception of naturalism, and interpreting him in this way it has the added benefit—contra Millikan—of not divorcing teleology from reason, the latter construed as our first-personal striving to make sense of the world as we experience it—of life.</p> Jacob Rump ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sat, 22 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0100 The Telos of Consciousness and the Telos of World History <p>This article explores the way in which Husserl’s transcendental idealism reverses the thesis stemming from the naturalistic worldview, according to which the existence of humanity in the universe is a contingent fact. It will appear that the resulting teleological account of the world history does not interfere with the traditional explanations provided by the empirical sciences and that it is a consequence of the teleology inbuilt in the correlation between transcendental subjectivity and the world. The conclusion is reached by analyzing some of Husserl’s text concerning the transcendental role of embodiment and normality.</p> Emiliano Trizio ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sat, 22 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0100 Husserl on the Existence of Only One Real World Synthesis and Identity (II) <p>This paper aims at discussing a quite specific aspect of Husserl’s phenomenology, i.e., the notion of synthesis of identification, and the role it plays in the arguments set forward in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation during the discussion of the constitution of the other, hence of the monadological inter-subjectivity. The case will be made for considering the very heart of the Meditation to be what we will refer to as Husserl’s “transcendental argument”, consisting in the claim that there can be only one inter-subjectivity, hence, the “world” being the correlate of the transcendental monadological inter-subjectivity, only one real and actual world. This will also give us the opportunity to critically approach a series of views lately held by some leading figures of the “continental” and “analytic” tradition, which, as the first part of the essay will show, pursue views directly opposed to Husserl’s.</p> Daniele De Santis ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sat, 22 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0100 On Affect: Function and Phenomenology <p>This paper explores the nature of emotions by considering what appear to be two differing, perhaps even conflicting, approaches to affectivity—an evolutionary functional account, on the one hand, and a phenomenological view, on the other. The paper argues for the centrality of the notion of function in both approaches, articulates key differences between them, and attempts to understand how such differences can be overcome.</p> Andreas Elpidorou ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sat, 22 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0100