Embodiment, Disembodiment and Re-embodiment in the Construction of the Digital Self

  • Federica Buongiorno TU Dresden
Keywords: Embodiment, Digital Self, Phenomenology, Mind-body problem, Digitalization

Abstract

In this article I will show that the problem of embodiment goes back to the question of the mind-body split, as this has been established and discussed by the philosophical tradition. With the digital turn and the advent of ubiquitous computing the problem of embodiment has taken new (and far more complicated) forms that have led scholars to introduce the notion of a “new digital Cartesianism.” Subjectivation processes within digital culture have mostly been explained by resorting to what I will call the “E-D-R scheme,” (embodiment-disembodiment-reembodiment scheme) which assumes that a real detachment between the body and the mind really occurs in digital processes. Since—as I will show—this is not actually the case, I will suggest replacing this epistemological scheme with a new one, which I will call the “double-embodiment scheme,” in order to acquire a more fitting epistemological account of the underlying digital ontology. Finally, I will discuss the distinction between bodily extension and the incorporation of non-bodily objects introduced by Helena De Preester in order to show that, in the digital realm, this distinction is much more blurred and complex than she acknowledges: digital interaction requires both bodily extension and the incorporation of objects as complementary processes.

Published
2019-12-27
How to Cite
Buongiorno, F. (2019). Embodiment, Disembodiment and Re-embodiment in the Construction of the Digital Self. HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies, 12(36), 310-330. Retrieved from http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/290