Practical Self-Deception

  • Eric Funkhouser University of Arkansas, USA
Keywords: self deception, beliefs, practical identities

Abstract

Philosophical accounts of self-deception almost invariably treat it as a phenomenon concerning belief. But this article argues that, in the very same sense that we can be self-deceived about belief, we can be self-deceived about matters that concern our practical identities — e.g., our desires, emotions, values, and lifestyles. Given that our practical identities are at least as important to us as are our beliefs, philosophical accounts of self-deception should accommodate such practical self-deception.

Published
2018-06-03
How to Cite
Funkhouser, E. (2018). Practical Self-Deception. HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies, 5(20), 86-97. Retrieved from http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/195