Heidegger and the Weltbild

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ABSTRACT

I give an account of Heidegger’s transformation of his early concept of the “world” in Being and Time into the conception of the Weltbild, of the world as a picture, in The Age of the World Picture. Such concepts as “subject”, “object” and “Vorstellung”, which in Being and Time are regarded as mistakenly applied to the world and our relationship to it, are, in the later work, regarded as correctly applicable to the modern world. In particular I consider the connection between Heidegger’s religious beliefs and his view of the modern world. I raise the objection that Heidegger’s account of the modern world is self-refuting, in that, if his account were accurate, he would be unable to give that account. I conclude by suggesting that neither the encapsulation of the world in a picture nor Heidegger’s conception of it is as novel as he supposes.

The concept of the world is central to the major work, Being and Time, that Heidegger published in 1927.¹ Dasein, or man, is essentially “in-the-world”. Conversely, there would be no world if there were no Dasein. For the world, in Heidegger’s usage, is not simply «all the things there are» or «beings as a whole»; it essentially involves the «significance» conferred on things by Dasein’s presence in it. The world radiates out from the familiar Unwelt, our “environment” or the “world around” us. Things are knit together to form a unified world by significance: the tools we use refer to other tools, and together they form a workplace, which in turn refers to the wider world beyond the workplace. The craftsman’s hammer refers to his nails, to wood and leather, and the bench on which he works; beyond the workplace are his customers, the

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¹ Heidegger, 1962. My page references are to the pagination of the first German edition, which are printed in the margins of the translation. I abbreviate the title as BT.
cows that supply the leather, the forest that supplies the wood, and so on in indefinitely expanding circles of decreasing familiarity. *Dasein’s* being-in-the-world involves familiarity with the world, knowing one’s way around in it (BT, p. 80). But neither individually nor collectively does *Dasein* know everything about the world or have the world in its control. *Dasein* is “historical”. Among other things, we have an awareness of the history of our world before we entered it and of its persistence after we have departed from it. But there is no clear indication that the world changes radically over the course of its history. The world that *Being and Time* describes seems to be the sort of world that *Dasein* inhabits at all times and all places.

On the whole, the book does not suggest that this world is seriously defective. We are, however, prone to make certain mistakes in our account of the world and of our place in it. For example, philosophers, and not only philosophers, often assume that our relationship to the world is that of a «subject» in relation to an «object» and that this relation consists in the subject’s having a *Vorstellung*; a «representation» or idea of the object that reflects it more or less accurately. Heidegger rejects the subject-object model for several reasons: it ignores our being-in-the world that is a precondition of our encounters with objects or beings as such; it implies that the subject and the object have the same mode of being, that they are both «present-at-hand» [vorhanden]; it «thematises» entities, makes them conspicuous, neglecting what we see out of the corner of our eye, what we are vaguely, unobtrusively aware of (BT, p. 363); it suggests that our primary mode of access to things is cognition or theoretical knowledge; it implies that the subject is like a snail in its shell (XX, pp. 223f, separated from the object by a gulf that can only be surmounted by a representation; and it suggests that a person is primarily an I or ego, detached from the body, the world and from others, and aware of itself by reflection on the I, when in fact *Dasein* is primarily aware of itself in what it deals with (BT, p. 119; XXIV, p. 227). Heidegger similarly disputes the role that philosophers have assigned to «representations». The assumption, made by Descartes, Kant and Brentano, that every judgment and emotion is based on a representation, involves an unwarranted theoretical bias. I do not fear something because of a prior representation of a threat; rather, I perceive a threat only because I fear it (BT, p. 139; XX, p. 396). Fundamental moods such as anxiety and boredom

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2 Roman numerals refer to the volumes of Klostermann’s *Gesamtausgabe* of Heidegger’s works.
do not have an object that might be represented. We do represent things, but this does not entail that what we primarily perceive, remember, etc. is a representation. Vorstellen is «letting something be seen» [Sehen-lassen von etwas], not something that is itself seen, like a picture (XX, p. 45). Seeing a picture, and seeing something in a picture, are quite different from seeing things in the flesh. Seeing does not involve a mental picture: «Nothing of that sort is to be found; in the simple sense of perception I see the house itself» (XX, p. 56).

In the 1930s Heidegger modified, or at least developed, his account of the world. Whereas Being and Time portrayed the human condition as relatively unchanging, he now believes that the world changes radically over time. The world of the ancient Greeks was quite different from the medieval world and this in turn was different from the modern world. The changes, he believes, are brought about by «metaphysics», by our fundamental view of the nature of beings. Metaphysics is concerned with beings as such, not only with our parochial environment, and so he now becomes less inclined to characterise the world in terms of human needs and practices and more inclined to speak of it as «beings as a whole» (das Seiende im Ganzen – an expression that occurs only once in Being and Time – p. 248 – and in a derogatory sense). He regards the history of such changes as the «history of being» [Seinsgeschichte]. In the Question Concerning Technology (1949)3 Heidegger assigns the first appearance of the concept of Seinsgeschichte to his On the Essence of Truth, delivered in 1930 and published in 1943, when he wrote:

[The] ek-sistence of historical man begins at the moment when the first thinker takes a questioning stance towards the unhiddenness of beings by asking what beings are. [...] History first begins when beings themselves are specifically promoted to unhiddenness and maintained in it, when this maintenance is conceived in terms of questioning about beings as such. The initial unconcealing of beings as a whole, the question about beings as such, and the beginning of western history are the same [...] Man ek-sists - this now means: the history of the essential possibilities of a historical mankind is maintained for it in the unconcealing of beings as a whole. The rare and simple decisions of history spring from the way the original essence of truth essences. (Heidegger, 1978b, p. 188; 1993b, p. 127).

The concept of *Existenz* referred in *Being and Time* to man’s or *Dasein’s* stance towards the world in which he is, but now it refers to the establishment and maintenance of such a world. In the 1930s, when Heidegger began to use the expression *Geschichte des Seins* (Heidegger, 1987, p. 70; 1961b, p. 77), he insists that the history of being is not initiated or promoted primarily by men, but by being itself. Metaphysics or philosophy plays a dominant part in the history of being. But metaphysics springs from the history of being, not from human choices. A thinker is «one of those individuals who have no choice, who must give expression to what beings are at any given stage in the history of their being».¹ *Seinsgeschichte* is thus associated with *Geschick* (fate, destiny), but for Heidegger «a sending, what is sent», owing to its affinity to *sichchen* (to send). For example, the medieval distinction between *essentia* and *existentia* reaches us from a *Seinsgeschick*, from «being’s fateful sending» (Heidegger, 1978a, pp. 326, 332f; 1993a, pp. 232, 238f). Heidegger’s *Seinsgeschichte* differs from Hegel’s history of «spirit» (1978a, p. 332; 1993a, pp. 238f), since there is no law by which being progresses, no «dialectical» change of one category into another (LXV, p. 135). The major turning-points in the history of being are «providentially sent» and opaque to us, not intelligible consequences of what went before. Nor is there any sense in which one large historical stage represents an improvement on its predecessors. Science, for example, makes progress no more than art does:

we cannot say that Galileo’s doctrine of the free fall of bodies is true and Aristotle’s doctrine that light bodies strive upwards is false; the Greek conception of the essence of body and place and their relationship rests on a different interpretation of beings and thus engenders a correspondingly different way of viewing and examining natural processes — no more than we can say that Shakespeare’s poetry is better than Aeschylus’s. (Heidegger, 1950, p. 71; 1977a, p. 117)

Nevertheless, Heidegger, like Hegel, believes that philosophical thoughts are the mainspring of history and that, since such thoughts form and transform human beings, they must be the product not of ordinary human thought and activity, but of a large impersonal force such as being or spirit. He still adheres to the view he expressed in *Being and Time*, that being is «projected» (NH, II,

The project is thrown and the projecter is thrown in the project. But the projecter is not a definite, historically situated individual, choosing his project from a pre-existing menu. He only becomes an individual capable of choice in virtue of his project. The project is thus governed by being itself.

The history of being involves various «epochs», *Epoche*(a). Heidegger relates the term to the Greek *epoche*, “restraint”. Throughout the history of metaphysics being «keeps to itself, restrains itself», and «from the particular distance of its withdrawal» — a distance which varies over time — it determines «a particular epoch of the history of being» (NH, II, p. 383; ET, IV, p. 238). *Epoche* comes from *epechein*, “to hold on, stop, etc.”; a historical “epoch” begins when ordinary time-reckoning “stops” — at a point that Heidegger calls an *Augenblick*, “moment (of vision)”. Being has a history because it withdraws from us and provides only partial and occasional glimpses of itself:

All events in the history of being, which is metaphysics, have their beginning and ground in the fact that metaphysics leaves the essence of being undecided and must do so, since from the start metaphysics remains preoccupied with the salvation of its own essence and indifferent to an appreciation of the question-worthy. (NH, II, p. 459; Heidegger, 1973, p. 56). 5

Metaphysics focuses on beings; it does not explore the full abundance of being, or reduce it to a single aspect of itself, extruding everything else from it. So being can unfold its essence through the ages, revealing hidden aspects. Being is like a rich text. If a commentator were to destroy the text, leaving only his interpretation, interpretation of the original text would cease. But if the original remains along with its interpretation, interpretation can continue, successively revealing different aspects of the text.

In his essay *The Age of the World Picture*, Heidegger mentions three such epochs: the ancient Greek, the medieval and the modern. In the usual sense of the term “world-picture”, he would say that each of these epochs is marked by a distinct world-picture. The word *Weltbild* is composed of *Welt*, “world”, and *Bild*, “picture”, and is naturally and commonly taken to mean a «picture of the world». A world-picture in this sense is distinct from a *Weltanschauung*. This word is similarly formed from *Welt*, “world”, and *Anschauung*, “view, etc.”, and means “view of, outlook on, the world”. A *Weltbild* is usually associated

with science or a science ("the mechanistic world-picture", "the physicist’s world-picture", etc.), while a Weltanschauung can be prescientific as well as scientific. A Weltbild is usually a theoretical view of the external world, while a Weltanschauung is essentially a "view of life", a view of our position in the world and how we should act (cf. Heidegger, 1950, p. 86; 1977a, pp. 133f). Adherents of the same Weltbild may hold different world-views, and enter into conflict, employing the weapons supplied by their common Weltbild (Heidegger, 1950, p. 87; 1977a, pp. 134f). Communists, fascists and liberals, for example, have different world-views, but according to Heidegger they share the same world-picture. A Weltbild is only one constituent of a Weltanschauung. In lectures delivered in the winter of 1928–9, he said: «According to [Dilthey’s] characterization we thus have three features in the structure of the Weltanschauung: life-experience, Weltbild, and, arising from the relation of these, an ideal of life» (XXVII, p. 236).

The modern Weltbild underlies several phenomena that differentiate it from its ancient and medieval predecessors: science, especially mathematical science, with its «ongoing activity» [Betrieb], its rigour, its specialisation, and its institutes; machine technology; the reduction of art to an object of «experience» [Erlebens]; the conception of human activity as «culture» and as the realisation of «values», the concern of a «cultural policy»; a godlessness that co-exists with the «modernization» of the «Christian Weltanschauung» and with intense «religious experience» (Heidegger, 1950, pp. 69f; 1977a, pp. 115f). Underlying all this, even natural science, is the very idea of a Weltbild. At first sight it means a "picture of the world", where the picture is not coextensive with the world. But if we read it in the light of such expressions as "being in the picture", "putting oneself in the picture", "getting the picture" — which, like their German equivalents, imply a complete mastery of what the picture is a picture of — we see that

world-picture essentially means not a picture of the world, but the world conceived as picture. Beings as a whole are now taken in such a way that they are in being first and only insofar as they are presented [gestellt] by man the representative and producer [vorstellend-herstellenden Mensch]. The emergence of the Weltbild involves an essential decision about beings as a whole. The being of beings is sought and found in the representedness of beings. (Heidegger, 1950, pp. 82f; 1977a, pp. 129f).

So, for Heidegger Weltbild is distinctively modern. There is no medieval Weltbild: men are assigned their place by God in his created order. There is no
Greek Weltbild: man is at the beck and call of being. There is no ancient or medieval «system», an essential requirement for the reduction of the world to a picture (Heidegger, 1950, pp. 93f; 1977a, pp. 141f). Ancient and medieval man was not a «subject»: «The world’s becoming a picture is one and the same process as man’s becoming a subjectum among beings» (Heidegger, 1950, p. 85; 1977a, p. 132). Hence humanism arises at the same time as the Weltbild, a «philosophical interpretation of man that explains and assesses beings as a whole in terms of man and with a view to man» (Heidegger, 1950, p. 86; 1977a, p. 133).

Since man is “in the picture”, is the central focus of the world as picture, Weltanschauung, which concerns man’s position in the world, goes together with Weltbild: «As soon as the world becomes a picture, the position of man is conceived as Weltanschauung» (Heidegger, 1950, p. 86; 1977a, pp. 133f). Stellung; “position”, comes from stellen, “to position, set up, stand” — which also forms vorstellen, “to represent”. It can mean a military “position”, a physical “posture” in relation to one’s surroundings, or one’s “position, attitude” towards a person, question, etc. Man’s present «position in the midst of beings» not only differs from that of ancient and medieval man: «Now for the first time is there anything like a position of man at all» (Heidegger, 1950, p. 84; 1977a, p. 132). For just as modern man decides about the contents of the world as picture and their arrangement, so he decides what his own position in it is to be; he positions himself, takes up a position, in way that no previous type of man has done. Our age is “new” or “modern” not only because it differs from previous ages, but because «to be new belongs to the world that has become a picture» (Heidegger, 1950, p. 85; 1977a, p. 132). The whole picture and our position in it is within our control, so we can start from scratch and remake everything anew.

In Being and Time Heidegger argued that certain concepts — notably those of a subject, an object and representation — were misapplied by philosophers so as to distort our conception of ourselves, of the world and of our relationship to it. Now Heidegger applies these concepts to the world itself, believing that they accurately capture the nature of the modern world. Modern man is not simply mistakenly regarded as a subject. He is a subject, and to that extent he is not Dasein (NH, II, p. 25f; ET, III (The Will to Power as Knowledge and
This «subjectivity» is descended from Descartes’s quest for an «absolute and unshakeable foundation» (NH, II, pp. 429ff; Heidegger, 1973, pp. 26ff), but it has gone beyond cartesian confines. The subject is no longer an individualised I, it is embodied man, even collective man. It is no longer restrained by a barrier; its dominance of producible and manipulable objects is unrestrained (NH, II, p. 25f; ET, III, p. 179f; NH, II, p. 171; ET, IV, p. 121; Heidegger, 1950, pp. 85f; 1977a, p. 133). It is no longer a sheer mistake to describe the world as consisting of objects. Objects are represented [vorgestellt], but this no longer means that man has a mental picture of them; it now means that man places [stellt] them before [vor] himself, that it is man who decides whether and what they are. Everything is an object for this subject: there are no unexplored areas or aspects of the world beyond man’s theoretical and practical reach. Subjectivity, and the «objectivisation» [Objektivierung, Vergegenständlichung] it involves, may go so far that «subjects» disappear in favour of a comprehensive utilizability (NH, II, p. 26; ET, III, p. 180), and humanity becomes a «human resource» [Menschenmaterial], to be managed and exploited like any other material (NH, II, p. 387; ET, IV, pp. 241f).

There remains, however, an «invisible shadow that is cast over all things, when man has become the subjectum and the world a picture». To manage the world as picture we need to think in terms of quantity and measurement, the “calculable”. «Each historical age [...] has its own particular concept of greatness», and our concept of it is purely quantitative, the «gigantic» — not only gigantic monuments, but the traversal of vast distances at immense velocities, etc. The difference between one concept of greatness and another is not, however, a quantitative, but a qualitative difference. Hence the «gigantism of planning and calculating [Berechnung] [...] veers round into a quality of its own» and then it becomes incalculable (Heidegger, 1950, p. 88; 1977a, p. 1357). Just as the essence of technology is not itself technological, so the essence of calculation and the calculable is not accessible to calculation. We should not retreat into tradition and reject the Weltbild, but think it through in an uncalculating way.

6 Cf. LXV, p. 90.
7 Cf. LXV, pp. 441ff.
Heidegger’s picture analogy deserves more attention than he gives to it. There are two relevant senses of “in the picture”. In one sense, which we might call the “literal sense”, something is in a/the picture if it is portrayed or depicted in a/the visual representation, that is, a drawing, a painting or a photograph. Anything might be in a picture in this sense: a rock, a tree, an animal or a human being. But such a picture does not contain everything. It depicts a selected segment of the world, not the whole world. Moreover, while the author of the picture and the spectator might appear in the picture, they are not exclusively in the picture, but also exist outside the picture. If the author of such a picture—the drawer, painter, or photographer—is sufficiently skilful, she/he has control over the picture and considerable awareness of its form and contents. In another sense, a “colloquial” or “figurative” sense, a picture is a state of affairs or situation, and to be “in the picture” is to be fully aware of such a state of affairs or situation. Similarly, to “get the picture” is to become aware of certain circumstances or facts. Only a human being, or possibly an intelligent creature of some other species, can be in, or get, the picture in this sense. On the other hand, the picture that one is in, or gets, might include almost anything, though the idiom is more commonly used with regard to human affairs. But again the picture that one is in, or gets, does not include everything, the whole world, but only a segment of the world. Most of the world lies outside the picture in this sense, as well as in the literal sense. Although someone who is in or gets the picture in the figurative sense is aware of the picture, he or she need not be in control of the picture in the way that an artist or photographer is. A jilted lover may well get the picture, but be unable to do anything to remedy it.

Heidegger’s handling of this material has two distinctive features. First, he combines elements from both senses of “picture”. If the world is a picture, it is not a picture of something. (Heidegger does not suggest that it is a picture of being. At least it could not be conceived as a picture of being by its adherents.) So it is a picture in the figurative sense, the world conceived as a state of affairs. And it is a picture that we are in, in the sense that we are supposed to be fully aware of it. But it is also a picture that is in our control, and this is a feature derived from the literal sense: the artist is in control in a way that the person who gets the picture may not be.

Secondly, the world-picture is a picture of the world, of beings as a whole, not simply of a segment of the world. But does it include everything? In particular, does it include human beings themselves? Heidegger does not give an unequivocal answer to this question. On the one hand, human beings are be-
ings and should therefore be included among beings as a whole. On the other hand, a literal picture does not include its maker or its spectators in such a way as to eliminate their existence outside the picture. Again, Heidegger distinguishes sharply between subjects and objects; human beings are subjects, not objects. The complete objectification of human beings, the elimination of subjects and their transformation into utilizable human resources is mentioned as a future prospect, not as an essential feature of the modern world-picture.

Heidegger’s implicit answer is that the modern world-picture involves the doctrine that “Man makes himself” – a doctrine espoused by, among others, Jean-Paul Sartre, in his Existentialism and Humanism, and by the Marxist archaeologist V. Gordon Childe in Man Makes Himself (Sartre, 1946; Childe, 1936). «Man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards. [...] man is nothing other than what he makes of himself», Sartre wrote. Expressions of the doctrine are conveniently ambiguous. They might mean either that each man individually makes himself or that mankind collectively makes itself. Sartre no doubt intended it in the former sense, while Childe meant it in the latter (and more plausible) sense. But for Heidegger this makes little difference. Man, whether collectively or individually, is placed at the centre of things. In effect, man replaces God. On the traditional view, God makes (or causes) himself, or at least he is not made or caused by anything else. God creates the world as a whole and has complete knowledge of it and complete control over its contents. For God therefore the world is somewhat like a picture and God is both its omnipotent creator and its omniscient spectator. But now man has assumed this role. Sartre and Childe were straightforward atheists. Heidegger was neither a straightforward atheist nor a straightforward theist. He did not believe in God as traditionally conceived, as an omnipotent and omniscient creator. Being is not God, he insists, because, unlike God as traditionally conceived by e.g. Thomas Aquinas, being is not a being or entity. But to say this does not amount to atheism: «better to swallow the cheap accusation of atheism, which in any case, if intended ontically, is fully justified. But is not the supposed ontical faith in God at bottom godlessness?» (XXVI, p. 211, n.3) and: «What looks, and must look, to the ordinary understanding like “atheism” is at bottom the opposite» (NH, I, p. 471; NH, II, pp.

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8 Sartre, 1946, p. 29: «Cela signifie que l’homme existe d’abord, se rencontre, surgit dans le monde, et qu’il se définit après. [...] l’homme n’est rien d’autre que ce qu’il se fait». 
Belief in God or gods, Heidegger claims, stems from the understanding of being that \textit{Dasein} requires in order to be-in-the-world, to "transcend" to the world or to beings as a whole (XXVI, p. 211, n. 3), and he often speaks of God and gods in writings from the same period as \textit{The Age of the World Picture}. Heidegger’s view is this: In order to be properly human, we need God or gods, since they serve as our life-line to being. But they are not being itself, nor are they Aquinas’s “God”. They are historically variable manifestations of being. Greek antiquity and medieval Europe had their gods, but in the age of the world-picture gods have been supplanted by man. The Greek gods died with the Greek city-state, though poets and scholars intermittently revive them. The Christian God is now dead or dying, killed off by, and partly responsible for, the metaphysics and technology that threaten humanity’s survival. To survive this danger we shall, like every preceding age, need a new god or gods – the number is yet to be decided (LXV, p. 437) –, the last god, quite different from the gods of the past, especially the Christian god (LXV, p. 403; cf. also XXXIX, pp. 93ff). The last god is the «truth of being», not being itself (LXV, p. 35).\footnote{This is presumably what Heidegger had in mind when he said «Only a god can save us» \[\textit{Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten}\] in an interview with \textit{Der Spiegel} in 1966, but published after his death in \textit{Der Spiegel}30 (May 1976).}

The claim that Heidegger sees no order of merit between different epochs therefore needs qualification. Whatever may be the case about the relative merits of Aristotelian physics and Galilean physics, the modern age is, in Heidegger’s eyes, inferior to its predecessors in that it has severed the life-line to being that they retained. Neither being nor the gods can be accommodated in the world as picture. They cannot be completely known and controlled by man and are therefore excluded from the world as picture. But being, and the need for gods, are constants, not relative to any particular epochs. An epoch that excludes them is therefore deficient in comparison to those that accommodate them. Heidegger then faces a problem concerning the status of his own thought and discourse. If our access to being and the gods has been closed off and if the world as a whole has been firmly clamped into a manageable picture, how is it that Heidegger himself is able to glimpse being and the gods, to discern what is missing from the picture or, indeed, to see that it is a picture at all? It may well be the case that, as Heidegger says, adequate thought \textit{about} the world-picture cannot be conducted in the “calculating” terms allowed by the
world-picture itself. But this would only mean that if the world has been transformed into a picture without remainder, then the occupants of the picture cannot adequately think about the picture and their position in it. Heidegger might respond that the encapsulation of the world into a picture is not yet complete, that subjects have not yet been transformed into utilizable objects, and that he himself has even avoided becoming a “subject” by steering clear of Berlin and remaining in Freiberg, one of the remaining pockets of refuge that have escaped incorporation in the world-picture. But that still leaves another problem. Heidegger does not simply claim to have a hazy vision of something—being and the gods—that philosophers in earlier ages saw more clearly. He lays claim to a better understanding of being than any of his predecessors, except possibly such pre-Socratic thinkers as Parmenides and Heraclitus. How can this be so, if the modern world is as blinkered as he describes it? Within Heidegger’s own terms we might say that the modern world-picture (or “globalization”) has a flattening effect similar to that induced by the moods of anxiety and boredom, which Heidegger regarded as a stimulus to, perhaps even a necessary condition of, philosophical thought. We can also say that even if Heidegger is right about the general characteristics of the modern age, it still leaves unincorporated pockets from within which one can range in imagination over other times and places, for example, benefitting not only from the modern historical researches that Heidegger disparages, but from earlier histories that are still reprinted and which compare favourably with Heidegger’s own rather skimpy excursions into history. We might learn from Hegel, for example, that the world has been a picture before and that the picture eventually shattered:

Napoleon, in a conversation which he once had with Goethe on the nature of tragedy, expressed the opinion that its modern phase differed from the ancient, through our no longer recognizing a destiny to which men are absolutely subject, and that politics occupies the place of ancient fate [La politique est la fatalité]. This therefore he thought must be used as the modern form of destiny in tragedy—the irresistible power of circumstances to which individuality must bend. Such a power is the Roman world, chosen for the very purpose of casting the ethical individuals into bonds, as also of collecting all deities and all spirits into the pantheon of world dominion, in order to make out of them an abstract universality. [...] Through its being the aim of the state that individuals in their ethical life should be sacrificed to it, the world is sunk in melancholy: its heart is broken, and it is all over with the natural side of spirit, which has sunk into a
feeling of unhappiness. Yet only from this feeling could arise the supersensuous, the free spirit in Christianity.$^{10}$

REFERENCES


$^{10}$Quoted, with modifications, from Hegel, 1956, p. 278.


